Object recognition: The man who mistook his dog for a cat  by Humphreys, Glyn W
Dispatch 821
Object recognition: The man who mistook his dog for a cat 
Glyn W. Humphreys
Neuropsychological studies of people with specific
brain lesions have led to the theory that different parts
of the brain are responsible for recognizing living and
non-living objects. Now there is direct evidence from
activity measurements that this is the case.
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When people are asked to define different types of
object, they tend to stress contrasting properties [1,2]. For
example, living things (such as animals, fruits and vegeta-
bles) are typically defined in terms of their sensory or
perceptual properties — a carrot is thus ‘a tapering
orange-coloured vegetable’. In contrast, non-living things
or artefacts tend to be defined in terms of their functional
properties: a bed is a bed because it rests on the ground
and can be used to sleep on. Objects of many shapes,
sizes and colours can be beds, but carrots have particular
sizes, shapes and colour. Recent research suggests that
the sensory–perceptual and functional properties of
objects may be differentially important, not only for
defining but also for recognizing the different types of
object — that is, for realizing that a carrot is for eating and
a bed for lying on. Moreover, different neural areas may
be involved in processing these different properties in
everyday object-recognition tasks. Different neural areas
may be involved to varying degrees in the visual recogni-
tion of different types of seen object.
Category-specific recognition disorders
Historically, the main evidence that different neural areas
mediate the recognition of different types of object came
from neuropsychology, and the occurrence of so-called
‘category-specific recognition disorders’ after selective
brain lesions. There is now considerable evidence for
selective impairment in the identification of living things
— animals, fruits and vegetables — but not of non-living
things (for example, see [3,4]), and the contrary impair-
ment has also been reported in several cases [5–7]. This is
typically a problem of visual recognition — knowing, for
example, that a carrot is an object for eating — and not
just one of naming. Several different types of explanation
have been offered for these dissociations.
The most straight-forward theory is that visual recognition
systems are differentiated for contrasting semantic classes
of object — for living and for non-living things. For
example, Keil [8] has argued that the underlying concep-
tual representations of living and non-living things are
fundamentally different, derived from a basic distinction
between natural kinds. However, the empirical evidence
suggests that a more subtle distinction than strictly living
versus non-living is needed, as patients with problems in
recognizing living things may also have impairments with
inanimate stimuli such as precious stones, and they may
not have impairments in identifying parts of the body [9].
Another possibility is that such effects are artifacts, perhaps
reflecting differences in the knowledge patients had of
objects before their brain damage occurred. If someone
had little knowledge about animals beforehand, it would
hardly be surprising if there was selectively poor recogni-
tion of these items after the lesion. Arguing against this,
however, is the fact that the recognition of even the most
common objects, such as cats and dogs, can be disrupted. It
is very unlikely that adults who were pre-morbidly of at
least average intelligence should have been unable to
recognize such stimuli before the lesion happened. As I
shall discuss here, recent studies using functional imaging
techniques also argue against this theory.
A slightly different proposal, which still maintains that the
effects are artifactual, points to uncontrolled differences
between the stimuli. Living things may in general be less
familiar or more visually complex than non-living things,
and so patients may be impaired if their lesion disrupts the
recognition of stimuli that are either relatively unfamiliar
or visually complex [10,11]. However, selective impair-
ments for living things can still arise, even when stimuli
are matched for familiarity and visual complexity [3,4,12].
The advantage for non-living things cannot in all cases be
due to co-variation in item familiarity and complexity.
Such considerations also fail to account for the opposite
pattern of category-specific recognition disorders in
which some patients are less impaired for living than for
non-living things [5–7].
Remaining ideas contrast the importance of the different
properties used for recognizing living and non-living
things. If perceptual properties such as colour and shape
are important for defining living things and functional
properties for defining non-living things, it may be that
these contrasting properties are assigned different
‘weight’ in object recognition. Accurate encoding of
shape and colour is particularly important for recognizing
living things, whereas functional information is important
for recognizing non-living things — and although these
functional properties must be accessed via perceptual
descriptions of objects, the perceptual descriptions need
not be so detailed to allow retrieval of  the functional
properties of non-living things. This proposal enables us
to account for why problems in recognizing living things
can co-occur with problems in recognizing some inani-
mate objects, such as precious stones: the inanimate
objects affected are those that are  defined (and repre-
sented) in terms of their perceptual properties [9]. It is
also consistent with findings showing that colour informa-
tion plays a stronger role in the recognition of living than
non-living things [13].
There are at least two reasons why perceptual properties
are important for the recognition of living things. One is
that the perceptual properties of living things are consistent
across different occasions (in contrast, the perceptual prop-
erties of non-living things may vary). Hence it may be ben-
eficial for the brain’s recognition system to assign weight to
these properties as they are predictive of the particular
object. A second is that living things tend to belong to cate-
gories whose exemplars have similar perceptual structures
(animals all tend to have a head, body, legs and so on), so
that relatively fine perceptual differentiation is required for
recognizing living things relative to non-living things [14].
Categories of living thing with perceptually more dissimilar
exemplars (such as body parts) may often be spared-
precisely because objects in these categories require less
perceptual differentiation for recognition to occur.
Studies of neuropsychological patients represent imper-
fect experiments by nature, however, and it is unlikely
that naturally occurring lesions respect the functional
boundaries between different neural processes. It is not
guaranteed that the clustering of living things from non-
living things tells us about how objects are normally recog-
nized. It is of considerable interest, then, that recent
studies using functional imaging techniques have begun
to provide converging evidence for the role of different
properties in the visual recognition of living and non-
living things.
PET studies of object recognition
Both Martin et al. [15] and Perani et al. [16] have recently
used PET (positron emission tomography) techniques to
study neural differences in the identification of living and
non-living things. In such studies, scans of a radioactive
tracer such as 15O are used to measure regional cerebral
blood flow changes whilst subjects are undertaking partic-
ular cognitive tasks. In the study of Perani et al. [16], sub-
jects viewed slides containing two objects, and they had to
judge whether the objects depicted the same basic
stimuli; for example, they had to respond ‘yes’ if there
were two different types of dog, but no if there was a dog
and a cat. In one scan, living things were presented, and in
another non-living things. In addition, in two other scans
subjects had to match visual textures and non-nameable
two-dimensional shapes. 
The scans in the critical conditions — with living and non-
living objects — had subtracted from them the scans
obtained in the texture- and shape-discrimination tasks, to
eliminate any activation that reflected the early stages of
visual perception. Perani et al. [16] found that, relative to
these baselines, living and non-living objects activated dif-
ferent neural areas. Living things activated areas of the
occipital and inferior temporal regions of both cerebral
hemispheres. In contrast, non-living things activated more
anterior areas, particularly in the left hemisphere, includ-
ing extensive activation of the dorsolateral prefrontal
cortex. Subtraction of the scans for living things from
those for non-living things revealed selective activation of
the left fusiform and lingual gyri for living things, and
selective activation of the left inferior frontal gyrus for
non-living things (see Fig. 1).
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Figure 1
The regions of the cortex revealed by PET
studies [15,16] to be differentially activated in
response to living and non-living objects.
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The study by Martin et al. [15] used baseline conditions
in which subjects viewed pictures of meaningless non-
objects, and contrasted this with conditions in which they
were asked to name silently either living things (in one
scan) or non-living things (in another scan). As in the
study by Perani et al. [16], the authors found that identify-
ing living things led to the selective activation of more
posterior cortical areas than identifying non-living things
(centred on the left medial occipital lobe), and that iden-
tifying non-living things selectively activated the left pre-
motor region (left lateral inferior frontal cortex; in
addition, there was some selective activation of the left
middle temporal gyrus).
These PET studies are of interest on several counts. First,
they indicate the involvement of different neural areas in
the recognition of living and non-living things even when
subjects know the objects and can identify them; thus,
category differences cannot solely reflect lack of knowl-
edge for certain stimuli. Second, the studies converge with
the overall pattern of lesion sites found in patients with
impairments in the recognition of either living or non-
living things. Problems in recognizing living things tend to
be associated with more posterior lesions involving the
occipital–temporal lobe boundaries; problems for non-
living things tend to be associated with more anterior
(tempero-frontal) lesions [17]. Third, in functional terms,
the PET studies are consistent with the idea that
visual–perceptual properties are strongly weighted for the
recognition of living things, and functional properties are
for the recognition of non-living things. 
The medial occipital lobe and the occipital–temporal lobe
boundary regions are likely to be involved in processing
the perceptual properties of seen objects [18]; the region
involving the inferior frontal gyrus may be linked to motor
control [19]. The enhanced and selective activation of
these areas during the recognition of living and non-living
things indicates that information concerning perceptual
properties, and information concerned with motor control
and function, are differentially important for the recogni-
tion of living and non-living things respectively. In this
sense, the PET studies ground the category differences
relative to other research indicating the functional role of
particular brain areas. The work suggests that the neural
networks underlying the recognition of living and non-
living things differ, with the differences reflecting perhaps
not the semantic class of the stimulus but rather the partic-
ular type of information needed to recognize it uniquely.
There remain important questions for future research to
address, however. One concerns why there is enhanced
activation in posterior visuo-perceptual areas of the cortex
when living things are recognized. It may be that this
enhanced activity reflects the retrieval of learned percep-
tual properties of the objects, which is necessary before
recognition can take place. Alternatively it may reflect
increased perceptual processing, necessary to differentiate
the perceptual properties of the target objects from those
of other visually similar living things belonging to the
same semantic category. It may even reflect the greater
visual complexity or unfamiliarity of these items relative
to non-living things, as the PET studies have not as yet
carefully controlled for such variables in the manner of
more recent neuropsychological studies [3,4,12]. (In the
study of Perani et al. [16] it is also not clear that the simi-
larity of the stimuli on ‘different’ trials was equated across
the living and non-living things.) It may even be the case
that each of these different factors is important, with each
factor linked to different neural areas — for example, with
complexity affecting more posterior and familiarity more
anterior areas in the occipital–temporal lobe pathway [20].
The enhanced activity in the left dorsolateral cortex for
non-living things, found by Perani et al. [16], may even be
due to subjects having to imagine how to use the objects,
in order to judge that two objects were of the same basic
type. Imagery of how the objects are used may play little
part in judging whether two animals (for instance) are of
the same basic type (such as both dogs).
Some of these remaining issues can be addressed in func-
tional activation studies that map out the different stages
of object recognition, for instance separating the stages
involved in accessing visual memories from those involved
in retrieving functional knowledge. Only then can pro-
cessing differences between living and non-living things
be fully understood. We should also look to converging
evidence from neuropsychological studies, where (for
instance) problems in visual imagery can be evaluated in
patients with poor recognition of non-living things. These
converging approaches should help to overcome some of
the problems inherent in each research technique.
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